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Cognitive entrenchmentInformation systems (IS) are strategic in so far as they are used to realize strategic intent.
Yet, while much has been said about aligning IS functionality with the strategic intent and
how to organizationally implement strategically aligned systems, less is known of how to
successfully implement strategic change associated with system use – a truly critical chal-
lenge within strategic IS implementation. Drawing on a strategy-as-practice perspective
we address this gap by developing a multi-dimensional view of IS strategy, conceptualizing
three key challenges in the IS strategy process, to explain how and why a paper mill,
despite successfully implementing a strategic production management system, failed to
produce intended strategic change. We call this outcome strategy blindness: organizational
incapability to realize the strategic intent of implemented, available system capabilities.
Using a longitudinal case study we investigate how cognitive rigidity of key actors and
ﬁxed, interrelated practices shaped the implementation of the new production system.
We also identify core components and dynamics that constitute a richer multi-dimensional
view of the IS strategy implementation (alignment) process. In particular, we identify three
salient factors that contribute to strategy blindness – mistranslation of intent, ﬂexibility of
the IT artifact and cognitive entrenchment – and discuss how they affect strategic imple-
mentation processes. We conclude by discussing implications of our ﬁndings for IS strategy
theory and practice, especially the contribution of strategy-as-practice to this stream of
research.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Claims that strategic investments in information technology (IT) are instrumental to ﬁrms’ long-term survival are now
regarded as truisms. The truth behind these truisms, however, is that IT investments matter only as far as IT capabilities be-
come embedded in new organizational practice (Doherty and Terry, 2009; Galliers, 2011; Markus and Robey, 2004; Peppard
and Ward, 2004; Sambamurthy et al., 2003). Information systems (IS) strategies should therefore complement high-levelcase.edu
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Benbasat, 1996). While much attention is paid to the challenge of aligning a ﬁrm’s strategic intent with investments in IT
capabilities (Chan et al., 1997; Chan and Reich, 2007) and the challenge of organizationally implementing those IT capabil-
ities (Markus, 2004; Orlikowski, 2000), however, little is still known of how to implement the encompassing strategic change
(Silva and Hirschheim, 2007) from which strategic beneﬁts from IT investments ultimately ensue (Cooper and Zmud, 1990;
Wade and Hulland, 2004). Addressing this challenge, indeed, remains a critical concern for IS strategy practice and research
(Galliers et al., 2012; Nolan, 2012; Ward, 2012). To this end, we ask how and why successful organizational implementation of
new IT capabilities that align with strategic intent often leads to unexpected outcomes (cf. Markus and Robey, 2004; Robey
and Boudreau, 1999) in that they fail to produce intended strategic effects (cf. Franz et al., 1986; Robey, 1981). We label this
outcome strategy blindness: the organizational incapability to realize the strategic intent of implemented, available IT
capabilities.
Our observation is grounded in a longitudinal case study (Yin, 1989) at a Swedish paper mill (PaperMill hereafter). Adopt-
ing a strategy-as-practice perspective (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009), we focus on how situated actors and interrelated orga-
nizational practices (Orlikowski, 2000; Schatzki et al., 2001) shaped the implementation of a new production management
system. Building on IT adaptation (e.g., Beaudry and Pinsonneault, 2005) and change-recipient sense-making literature (e.g.
Balogun and Johnson, 2005, 2004), we investigate how cognitive entrenchment and associated ﬁxity of situated practices
(Dane, 2010) inﬂuenced the way PaperMill came to frame and cope with the new system during implementation and sub-
sequent use. Our ﬁndings are unorthodox: Technically, the implementation was successful as the system became embedded
in organizational routines and the mill viewed the implementation as a success (cf. Markus, 2004). Strategically, however,
the implementation failed, as it did not produce intended organizational change; instead of creatively using the new system
to enable the new strategic intent, the system was creatively implemented to reproduce existing practices. In essence, the
organization appears stubbornly and strategically blind. Our objective is to understand this dilemma and explore why some
organizations become engulfed in strategy blindness rather than promoting strategic change.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, we review the literature on IS strategy implementation to con-
ceptualize three key challenges within the IS strategy process and outline a multi-dimensional view of IS strategy and change
informed by strategy-as-practice research. We then review research on cognitive entrenchment to further reﬁne our theo-
retical lens. Next, we describe the research setting and approach before presenting the ﬁndings from our case. Having illus-
trated the use of our multi-dimensional perspective, we further detail its core components and underlying mechanisms and
discuss its possible applications. We then discuss three key factors that can contribute to strategy blindness, before conclud-
ing with a discussion of the implications of this research for both IS strategy practice and research.2. Related research
2.1. IS strategy research: intents, implementations and realizations
In their recent review, Chen et al. (2010) identiﬁed three persistent strands within IS strategy research: (1) alignment of
information systems with business strategy (e.g. Chan et al., 1997; Chan and Reich, 2007); (2) strategic information system
planning to identify such portfolios of systems (e.g. Galliers, 2004; Ward and Peppard, 2002) and (3) the resultant use of spe-
ciﬁc systems, or their combinations, for competitive advantage (e.g. Melville et al., 2004; Piccoli and Ives, 2005; Wade and
Hulland, 2004). Regardless of which strand is being examined, extant research assumes that any IS strategy is dependent
upon the way it is enacted. It is therefore critical to maintain tight linkages between the ﬁrm’s strategic intent, the ensuing
IS strategy implementation and the de facto realized strategy. This suggests three key challenges to successful IS strategy
implementation: (1) to achieve theoretical alignment between strategic intent and system capabilities; (2) to implement
the system organizationally and (3) to shape the use of the system and related practices to achieve practical alignment with
the strategic intent (Fig. 1). We review each of these challenges next.
The capability to build and maintain strategic intent is central to any successful IS strategy. A strategic intent ‘‘envisions a
desired leadership position and establishes the criterion the organization will use to chart its progress’’ (Hamel and Prahalad,
2005: 64). Accordingly, organizations that exhibit a consistent strategic intent will allocate their resources effectively and
engage in competitive activities that help achieve their objectives – including choices of IT systems and capabilities (Thomp-
son et al., 2010). While any large IS project involves the set-up of system objectives and selection of IT capabilities necessary
to achieve desired results (Keil et al., 2000), the ﬁrst challenge highlights how selected system objectives and capabilities do
not always mesh with the organization’s strategic intent (Mähring et al., 2004).
Even when the selected system capabilities align with the established strategic intent, however, the system implemen-
tation itself often proves another strategic challenge (Markus and Benjamin, 2003). Although apparent misalignments be-
tween strategic intent and system capabilities are evident in several failed strategic IS implementations (e.g. Pollock and
Cornford, 2004; Wagner and Newell, 2004), it is often the inability to implement the ‘strategically aligned’ system that causes
an IS strategy process to fail. In a sense, the concept of a successful organizational implementation as part of a successful IS
strategy has been part of the key assumptions of IS strategy literature, though not always explicitly stated. In fact, though
failed, incomplete or inadequate implementations of IT systems abound in their strategic context (e.g. Leonard-Barton,
1988; Orlikowski, 1996; Majchrzak et al., 2000; Soh and Sia, 2004; Boudreau and Robey, 2005), IS strategy literature typically
Fig. 1. Three critical dimensions within IS strategy implementation.
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alignment. Attempting to avoid associated pitfalls, we conceptualize the second strategic challenge as concerning the
capability to implement the system both on time and with acceptable risk, and in ways that fulﬁll the expectations of users
(cf. Markus, 2004; Silva and Hirschheim, 2007).
As a result of the unanticipated ways in which IT becomes appropriated in local practice (Barley, 1986; Orlikowski, 2000,
1992), however, not even an otherwise successful implementation of a strategically aligned system can ensure that strategic
intents materialize (e.g. Robey et al., 2002). Understanding the critical and complex role that practices play in shaping how IT
systems are enacted is thus key for successful IS strategy implementation (Orlikowski, 2000). Sadly, conceptualizations of
strategic IT use within organizations commonly rest on the naive assumption that, for the system to be strategically success-
ful, the IT systemmust just be successfully ‘embedded’ in relevant practices. Successful IS strategy implementation, however,
increasingly implies punctuation (Nolan, 2012; Ward, 2012) i.e. systematic re-structuring and re-arranging of organizational
practices (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1992; Silva and Hirschheim, 2007). In situations characterized either by deep, unex-
pected misalignment between conﬂicting organizational structures and the new IT system (inadequate or one-sided embed-
ding), or where local practices continue unchanged, alignment between the IT system and strategic intent will never be
reached and the strategic IS implementation will thus inevitably fail (Sia and Soh, 2007). Therefore, the third strategic chal-
lenge concerns the organizational capability to enact IT-enabled change: transforming and re-conﬁguring local practices to
align both system use and related organizational practices with the strategic intent.
While a major challenge for the IS strategy ﬁeld will continue to be that of dealing with the complexity of how each of
these three challenges play out in dynamic, networked political and economic contexts (Merali et al., 2012), we feel that the
last challenge is the least understood (cf. Silva and Hirschheim, 2007; Wade and Hulland, 2004). Although IS research has
largely failed to recognize this challenge in its own right (cf. Markus, 2004), alternative theoretical assumptions, such as
those offered by the strategy-as-practice perspective used here, hold great promise (e.g. Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009; Jar-
zabkowski et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2007). In viewing the IS strategy process as a bundle of situated, practical accomplish-
ments (Schatzki et al., 2001), it is indeed well equipped to elucidate the subtle interactions between challenges on the one
hand and the practical setting on the other. In so doing, it can provide key insights into how and why successful organiza-
tional implementation of new and strategically aligned IT capabilities sometimes fails to transform existing practices. To this
end, we next review the research on strategy-as-practice and discuss the concept of cognitive entrenchment (Dane, 2010),
which we argue is a common cause for the type of strategic failure we call strategy blindness.
2.2. Strategy-as-practice, IS and entrenchment
By arguing that strategy research has lost sight of human beings (e.g. Whittington, 2003) and mistakenly reduced strategy
to a few causally-related organizational and environmental variables (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007), the strategy-as-practice
perspective suggests the need to understand why and what strategic actors do as they construct, implement and realize stra-
tegic intents (Johnson et al., 2007; Whittington, 2003); researchers have, for example, commonly investigated how these
processes are shaped by actors’ emotions, motivations and social and political interactions (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009)
and the contexts in which they act (Jarzabkowski, 2005; Whittington, 2006).
Against this backdrop, the strategy-as-practice perspective directs attention to the practice of strategy – strategizing – and
the practices actors draw upon to justify and legitimize both the future state they seek to bring and the actions they take to
achieve this end (cf. Schatzki et al., 2001). In so doing, researchers often stress the performative dimension of strategy work:
As ‘‘actors in their micro-situations are not acting in isolation but are drawing upon [. . .] the social institutions in which they
48 V. Arvidsson et al. / Journal of Strategic Information Systems 23 (2014) 45–61belong’’ (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007: 6), the practices within which actors are situated structure (cf. Orlikowski, 2000; Schatzki
et al., 2001) strategic activities such as formulating strategic intents, choosing the system strategy and implementing the
system i.e. the process through which strategic IS implementation unfolds. Conversely, while present practices affect which
futures strategic actors seek, these envisioned futures simultaneously constitute particular realities, recursively shaping ac-
tions in the present (Kornberger and Clegg, 2011).
The strategy-as-practice perspective resonates with recent elements of IS strategy research which reinforce the idea that
IT matters only when it becomes embedded in local practices (Doherty and Terry, 2009; Galliers, 2011; Markus and Robey,
2004; Peppard and Ward, 2004; Sambamurthy et al., 2003). As practice, IS strategy seeks to realize the potential value of IT
by re-deﬁning and re-focusing the role of IT within organizations (Chen et al., 2010; Wagner and Newell, 2004). In so doing,
practices often have to be re-conﬁgured in order for value to be realized (Galliers, 2011; Melville et al., 2004); indeed, extant
research holds that business value derived from IT investments primarily emerges through business changes and related
innovations (Grover and Kohli, 2012; Mathiassen and Sorensen, 2008; Robey et al., 2002). As the strategic role of IT increas-
ingly shifts from supporting organizational practices to enabling bold organizational change (Nolan, 2012; Ward, 2012),
understanding how and why IT becomes locally embedded in a particular way is therefore a growing concern. It is against
this backdrop that we ask how and why some organizations fail to produce organizational change despite having success-
fully implemented new strategic IT.
Research on IT adaptation (e.g. Beaudry and Pinsonneault, 2005; Orlikowski, 2000, 1996; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) and
change-recipient sense-making (e.g., Balogun, 2006; Balogun and Johnson, 2005, 2004; Stensaker and Falkenberg, 2007) pro-
vide a solid foundation for addressing this question. For example, Beaudry and Pinsonneault (2005) suggested that actors
adapt to new IT systems as part of their cognitive and behavioral coping. Similarly, Orlikowski and Gash (1994) showed
how assumptions, knowledge and expectations about an IT system shaped its subsequent use. Orlikowski (2000, 1996) also
proposed a practice view of IT adaptation, perceiving use as enacted through situated practices. Furthermore, Balogun (2006)
argued that strategic change often results in unexpected outcomes because top management control is tenuous at most. Sim-
ilarly, Balogun and Johnson (2005, 2004) stressed the signiﬁcant role middle management plays as ‘change intermediaries’ in
the change-implementation, a position allowing them to frame both aims and outcomes. Stensaker and Falkenberg (2007)
offered a similar view, providing links between frames, responses and outcomes. Accordingly, IS and strategy-as-practice re-
search show a shared appreciation for how change-recipients inﬂuence change outcomes and the role cognitive schemata
and framing (sense-making) play during this process.
In this paper, we extend the cognitive framing literature by paying particular attention to the concept of cognitive
entrenchment. Dane (2010) deﬁned cognitive entrenchment as a high level of stability in an actor’s domain schemata. Sim-
ilarly, Sanger and Singh (2012) viewed it as the inability to unfreeze schemata that impair decision-making. Entrenchment is,
thus, a condition in which ﬁxed, stable frames make practices blind to changes in their environment. As schemata develop
over time, entrenchment can be associated with stability and ﬁxity of practices; repeated activation of a particular schema
tends to stabilize the structure and makes future revisions increasingly unlikely (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). While such norma-
tive alignment of thought and action (cf. March, 1994) may be unproblematic or even beneﬁcial in stable environments
(Feltovich et al., 1997), or to organizations that seek to protect culturally normative patterns of thinking (Dane, 2010),
entrenchment can be costly when ﬂexibility is needed, as is typically the case with strategic change. Indeed, as schemata
inﬂuence how actors think about events (Cooper and Shallice, 2006; Henderson and Hollingworth, 1999; Marshall, 1995;
Walsh, 1995), cognitive entrenchment inhibits problem solving, local adaptation and creative idea generation (Dane,
2010)1. Accordingly, cognitive entrenchment can produce signiﬁcant barriers to organizational change (Bartunek and Moch,
1987; George and Jones, 2001; Labianca et al., 2000) and, consequently, the realization of strategic intent.
By linking stable practices to ﬁxed relations, identities and meanings, these cognitive accounts resonate with seminal
practice accounts (e.g. Orlikowski, 2000; Schatzki et al., 2001). Indeed, actors’ schemata cannot easily be separated from
practice as ‘‘contained in the understandings that organize a practice are those conceptual understandings, given which
the meanings of the entities arranged in the practice are instituted’’ (Schatzki, 2001: 55). From a practice perspective, cog-
nitive entrenchment may, then, be a key to understanding how and why strategy blindness is produced; it helps understand
how and why strategic IT systems are implemented and subsequently used in ways that fail to produce the intended stra-
tegic effects.3. Research setting and approach
This study is based on a longitudinal case study of IS strategy implementation (Yin, 1989). Our orientation was interpre-
tative (Walsham, 1995), paying attention to meaning-making and context necessary for understanding local change (Klein
and Myers, 1999). This approach helped provide rich insight and support for theoretical development (Walsham, 1995).
Drawing on strategy-as-practice, we focused on the situated actors and practices that shaped the implementation of a1 For example, in failing to recognize alternative or different solutions due to cognitive ﬁxation (cf. Smith and Blankenship, 1991), actors may fail to adapt
appropriately to new opportunities and challenges despite changes in fundamental environmental conditions (cf. Lewandowsky and Thomas, 2009) e.g.
changes in strategic intent or access to new IT capabilities and information that permit or necessitate new forms of sense-making. Failing to combine and
reorganize these complex schemata will limit the generation of novel ideas and consequently transformation of local practices (cf. Dane, 2010; Mumford et al.,
2006).
Fig. 2. The paper production process.
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sought to offer a practice-based account of how cognitive entrenchment and ﬁxity of situated practices shaped the way
change-recipients came to frame and cope with the new system during its implementation and subsequent use.
3.1. Research context: paper production at PaperMill
PaperMill, a Swedish paper mill operated by PaperPack – a business group of PaperCo. – produces liner, a product used in
the manufacturing of corrugated board. PaperMill produces two grades of liner, each produced in a number of combinations
based on the grammage (mass/area). Annual production capacity is in excess of 400,000 tons. Production is dependent on a
process spanning ﬁve work units – Sales, Planning, Production, Loading and Shipping – and three organizations (Fig. 2). Our
primary focus was on the mill units as they were most directly affected by the implementation. Due to complex interdepen-
dencies, we also included Sales and Shipping to better understand the scope and intent of the strategic change the imple-
mentation should have brought about.
The production process begins at Sales. Orders are registered twice a week and determine production needs for the com-
ing ﬁve days. Once ordered, Sales expect products to be delivered to end-customers within 2–3 weeks. Sales make two types
of orders: forecast orders and direct orders, usually the former. While disruptive, ﬂexibility for direct orders is needed: serv-
ing customers is key.
Once orders are registered and matched against pre-produced stock to generate replenishment needs, Planning creates a
trim plan: an optimized, detailed plan of all products to be produced in the coming production period. For each production
period, several tambours are produced at a standardized weight of 38 tons and moved to the winder (Fig. 3), where they are
cut into reels with product-speciﬁc width and radius.
Once cut, reels are automatically transported to pre-designated ramps at the Loading bay. The bay has a storage capacity
of 100 reels, used primarily during the night when shuttles are not in operation. Once a shuttle arrives, truck drivers load
the shuttle, scan the loaded reels and send a load-accomplished order. At this point, the shuttles transport the reels to the
Shipping terminal, located at a nearby port, where they are eventually loaded for transport and shipped.
The production process incurs several types of losses e.g. trim losses resulting from the quilt-like pattern of products
placed on the tambour and length losses resulting from ﬂuctuations in quality as the paper grade is changed. Losses are also
incurred post-production – e.g. during handling of products – and pre-production – e.g. as a result of the non-uniform quality
of the tambour. To optimize production, trim planners thus need to take into consideration not only how to make best use of
the tambours, but also how trim plans affect other units within the process. While a complex plan allows for greater ﬂex-
ibility towards customer demand, for example, it also reduces manufacturability and adds complexity for Winding and Load-
ing. Most issues observed in our initial study stemmed from these complex interdependencies. Against this backdrop, it is
imperative that the entire process is integrated not only technically, but also organizationally and socially.Fig. 3. The paper machine and the winder.
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Data were collected primarily through interviews, on-site observations and reviewing documents such as internal reports
and project documentation (e.g. meeting notes and protocols, presentations, change-orders). In line with Klein and Myers
(1999), we strove to include representatives of all groups relevant for understanding the implementation process. Eliciting
data from multiple sources and in various forms allowed us to triangulate our data for authenticity (Yin, 1989). Data were
gathered in two phases, ﬁrst prior to implementation and second when the system was in use (Fig. 4). This allowed us to
study the changes resulting from the implementation by comparing past and present practices i.e. the activities and associ-
ated sense-makings, values and norms by which these activities are legitimately organized (cf. Schatzki et al., 2001). Analysis
of post-implementation adaptations also furthered our insight of how and why particular changes did or did not occur. Fig. 4
shows a timeline of key events.
In the ﬁrst phase, we were invited by mill managers to study issues in the production. This worked to our favor, ensuring
willingness to cooperate, availability of multiple sources and the potential for purposeful sampling (Peppard, 2001; Yin,
1989). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of the ﬁve units covered in this paper. In addition,
we conducted on-site observations at both terminal and mill. These observations offered a grounded understanding of the
production process whilst contextualizing our understanding of the issues the mill faced.
In the second phase, data collection focused on understanding the implementation outcome. To this end, we interviewed
people with rich insight into the process; notably, all respondents bar the trim planner had decades of work experience at
the mill. Observations from the ﬁrst phase helped inform our sampling. First, we interviewed the project manager (twice),
Head of Planning (twice), a trim planner (once) and an IT engineer (once). As they were key parts of the project team that
implemented the system, this offered rich and direct access into the implementation process and allowed us to elicit data
about the changes that had resulted. Second, to improve our understanding of the implications for Sales, we interviewed
a sales ofﬁcer (once). As a former planner, this offered key insights into both sides of the Sales/PaperMill divide. Third, four
formal interviews and several informal talks were carried out with a former CIO/CFO. This offered key insights into both stra-
tegic issues and practices at the mill and helped check the validity of early results, furthering the credibility and authenticity
of our ﬁndings (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In addition, on-site observations helped verify our understanding of the data.
Where necessary, post-interview follow-ups were also conducted.
Interviews were typically conducted in ofﬁces or adjacent conference rooms. Most interviews were recorded and tran-
scribed verbatim. Interviews at the winder and the terminal, however, were made ‘on the ﬂy’ where high levels of noise pre-
vented audio recording; instead, notes were taken. Notes were also taken during recorded interviews and on-site
observations. During visits at the mill, discussions with various employees were conducted to enrich our contextual under-
standing. Our understanding also beneﬁted from prior studies within the industry in general and PaperMill in particular. In
conclusion, this approach enabled us to analyze practices from the perspectives of professionals and helped us engage in pro-
ductive discussions with workers at the mill (Geertz, 1988; Ngwenyama and Klein, 1994).
3.3. Data analysis
In line with Klein and Myers (1999), data collection and subsequent analysis followed a hermeneutic cycle: throughout
the process, we have gone back and forth between whole and parts to gradually improve our understanding of the phenom-
ena under observation. While the ﬁrst author has carried out primary collection and analysis of data, all authors have thor-
oughly and regularly discussed emerging interpretations. This relates to issues of resolving contradictions and maintaining
suspicion of bias informing interpretative research (Klein and Myers, 1999). Analysis of data was carried out in three main
cycles (Fig. 4). First, data were analyzed using a grounded approach (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) with the aim of uncovering
and understanding issues at the mill. In particular, we sought to understand how issues could be alleviated and how these
issues impacted the overall production process. It is against this backdrop that we were puzzled that practices, rather than
changing as a result of the new system, had remained largely the same. At this point, the second cycle commenced.
Data were now re-analyzed to produce a richer understanding of the practices at themill. This involved reading and subse-
quently coding transcribed interviews andﬁeld notes, looking for statements and activities that offered insight into factors thatFig. 4. Timeline detailing key events.
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tions of Suddaby (2006). Through the coding process, emergent patterns were delineated. These patterns were then analyzed
and abstracted to form ﬁve thematic categories: (inter-) dependencies; ends and ideals (i.e. differences in goals, ambitions,
desired ways of organizing practices); complicating factors (i.e. issues that emerge as a result of these differences and environ-
mental factors); consequences and compromises (i.e. how and what they practically cope with given the situation) and last,
realized and possible improvements (i.e. what has and could be done differently post-implementation). In addition, we used
the data to create a detailed description of the production process to contextualize the codedmaterial and our understanding.
Noting that changes that reproduced and reinforced existing practices rather than altering them had occurred, while
improvements that necessitated organizational re-conﬁguration had not, the data suggested interesting phenomena ob-
scured from view. Looking for patterns in the changes and non-changes and the ways the respondents framed and con-
structed ambitions and intents, several theoretical conjectures were formed. These conjectures informed subsequent data
collection. Given our strategy-as-practice approach, we particularly sought to link these theoretical constructs with the sit-
uated practices that shaped the implementation and subsequent use of the new system. Ultimately, we adopted cognitive
entrenchment as our primary lens. With this, the last cycle of analysis began. Again, we went back and forth between whole
and part, reﬁning our understanding through iterative collection and analysis, until coherence between whole and parts was
achieved. While the ﬁrst two cycles of analysis were open, this cycle used the theoretical constructs underlying our conjec-
tures as a guide. In so doing, we paid heed to emerging generalizations and abstractions of data through the use of theories
(Klein and Myers, 1999).
4. Findings
In October of 2009, PaperMill began the implementation of a new production management – or mill execution – system
(MES). Some 18 months later, the system went live (Fig. 4). At the mill, the implementation is viewed as a success and the
system is, indeed, embedded in organizational routines. Yet, the mill largely operates as before. This is unexpected given that
the strategic intent necessitated change to routines and values – e.g. integrating work teams across the mill and making pro-
duction more ﬂexible – and that the capabilities offered by the system appear aligned with this intent. We begin this section
with an account of the general role of IT within PaperMill and offer insight into the long-term standardization initiative that
led to the implementation of the newMES. Next, we outline and contextualize the strategic intent underlying the implemen-
tation of MES. Then, we look both at the ways in which the system allowed for alignment with this intent and how the way
MES became embedded in practice is, in fact, misaligned with both intent and the strategic potential of the system. We con-
clude by providing insight into why PaperMill failed to realize this potential and instead of strategic change produced strat-
egy blindness.
4.1. IT systems and enterprise standardization at PaperPack
In the paper industry, three types of systems typically form the backbone of the enterprise architecture: enterprise sys-
tems (ERP), paper management systems (PMS) and mill execution systems (MES)2. ERP systems integrate internal and exter-
nal management and process information and support execution of key business processes within the organization and its
immediate value network. ERP systems are, in this sense, intended to enhance the ﬂow of information between business func-
tions and manage connections to external partners. In comparison, PMS and MES are more mill speciﬁc. Speciﬁcally, PMS sup-
port supply chain planning and follow-up as well as supply and demand balancing (e.g. forecasting of demand, stock
management and replenishment requirement management). In this sense, the PMS answers the questions what, when and
where orders are needed, keeping track of products as they are produced and shipped. In contrast, MES addresses the question
of how products are to be produced, translating replenishment requirements into products ready to be shipped. To this end,
modern MES use available information from the ERP and PMS to optimize production activities and guide, initiate, respond
to and report activities as they occur. In particular, the MES supports the production process by providing functionalities such
as production planning (e.g. production cycles, trimming), production execution (e.g. paper machine and winder integration, re-
trimming, reporting), quality management (e.g. measurements, tests, statistics), warehousing (Remote POS, storage), shipping
(Load building, transport, invoicing) and process monitoring (e.g. databases and monitoring tools). MES is thus a key strategic
component for planning, execution and coordination of the mill level production.
To optimize mill efﬁciency, it is critical that these systems are well integrated. For example, MES relies on PMS and vice
versa to maintain control over the ﬂow of production and production-related data, data that are also critical within the ERP
scope. As a result of consolidations, PaperPack’s mill-level system architecture had, however, become highly fragmented.
This made integration both costly and cumbersome and was often seen as a hindrance to the development of new IT func-
tionality. In the late 1990s, PaperPack therefore decided to standardize these key systems. Due to stated Y2k issues3 in the2 In some mills, these three areas are managed by two systems. For example, the scope of MES and ERP can be extended to reduce the need for a speciﬁc PMS.
In fact, this opportunity had been discussed in relation to the long-term IT strategy at PaperPack to standardize these key systems.
3 While the need to replace legacy systems and make systems Y2k-compliant was commonly used as the motivation for standardizing key assets such as ERP
during this time, companies also often used this as an excuse to address more enduring needs such as business process reengineering (BPR) and work practice
integration (Robey et al., 2002).
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systems operational, PaperPack began to implement a new MES across its mills. The ﬁrst mill went live in 2005, four additional
mills followed between 2006 and 2009. In 2009, implementation began at PaperMill. In the remainder of this paper, we restrict
our focus to this particular implementation.
4.2. PaperMill in context
PaperMill is one of several mills operated by PaperPack, a business group within PaperCo, a large multinational hygiene
and paper company with annual sales exceeding SEK 100bn ($15bn) in 2011. PaperPack is divided into two units: Mills (6)
and Facilities (110). The former produce liner and ﬂuting (raw material for corrugated board), the latter reﬁne these
products into various forms of packaging. As transport costs are substantial for these low cost products, proximity to the
end-customer is key. Consequently, facilities source material both internally and externally and, similarly, mills also
have external customers.
Within the highly fragmented European market that PaperPack strategically operates in, there is over-capacity and ﬁerce
competition4. In response, PaperPack has long tried to streamline their operations, divesting operations that fail to meet ﬁnan-
cial targets while shifting resources to those that do. In parallel, PaperPack has also sought to improve customer relations by
offering integrated services and increase ﬂexibility to better meet customer demand. Enhancing production efﬁciency and cus-
tomer relations have, indeed, come to form key elements of PaperPack’s strategic intent. To this end, PaperPack views lean pro-
duction as key. Asked what lean means to PaperMill, the former CFO/CIO said ‘‘Reduce waste; become more customer-oriented
and engage people on the shop-ﬂoor.’’ Elaborating on what this means for integration of practices, he stated: ‘‘You always want
to serve the customer ﬁrst. But [. . .] there should be a will to do everything as smooth as possible. That is what lean is about [. . .]
continuous improvements.’’ He also stressed the necessity of efﬁcient logistics: not only are transport costs critical, second only
to the cost of raw materials, the ability to deliver the right product at the right time is also key to customer satisfaction.
4.3. Strategic intent underlying MES
The new MES was implemented after a large effort to standardize core systems at PaperPack-operated mills. The system
at PaperMill that the newMES came to replace (Legacy System (LS)) was implemented in the 1980s and had a long history of
use. Due to incremental adaptations, LS had become increasingly fragmented. This fragmentation resulted in high support
costs while increasing obsolescence led to scarce resources available for its support. Both project manager and Head of Plan-
ning stressed that the system had become a production risk.
Against this backdrop, there were many technical IT reasons for implementing the new MES e.g. improved ease of inte-
gration between key systems, reduced support costs and potential for future development. As such, PaperPack’s decision to
implement MES was largely welcomed by the mill. As later shown, this is also the intent that is recognized by the project
team. These reasons for implementing the new system were, however, only one side of PaperPack’s motivation for the
investment: the opportunity to integrate and improve work practices, reduce lead-times and make production more ﬂexible
were also stated as expected strategic beneﬁts, intents well aligned with PaperPack’s strategic focus overall. Accordingly,
there was a strategic intent justifying the MES implementation from a business perspective as well. We expand on this next.
4.4. MES in practice
The practices that make up the production process are highly interrelated and interdependent, forming a coherent system
of practice (i.e. a practical ordering and understanding to which the individual practices relate). Within this system,
differences in ideals (i.e. desired practices) and goals (i.e. results that the individual practices control and seek to achieve)
provide a rich source of issues at the mill. For example, Sales has to consider shipping schedules, which in turn means that
they have to rely on the production teams to plan and execute plans accordingly. Trim planners, however, also need to
consider manufacturability, as low manufacturability leads to increased waste, added workload and production risks (e.g.
products being damaged either at the winder or during loading). Similarly, as trim planners seek to optimize the trim, they
prefer highly standardized products and few changes to production plans. Sales, however, want to offer a wide range of
products and stress the need for more ﬂexibility in adding late orders, upsetting pre-existing plans, again producing negative
downstream effects by increasing complexity for workers at both Winding (e.g. necessitating more knife adjustments and
generating more waste) and Loading (e.g. complicating loading and increasing the risk of damaging products). During our
ﬁrst visit, such issues, stemming from contradictory desires of increased ﬂexibility and decreased complexity, were prevalent
across the mill.
The new MES made it possible to address and alleviate issues as these, whilst providing the means for coping with or
reducing new issues generated as a result of the intended change. According to PaperPack’s evaluation, the improved func-
tionality provided by the new MES enabled higher ﬂexibility and shorter lead times, greater transparency of production4 Within the European market, the ﬁve largest actors have a combined share of 44% of rawmaterial production capacity and 39% of the capacity for producing
packaging. With 8% in both (2011), PaperPack is the second largest actor in the market.
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ply chain optimization, sharing of best practices and lean progress to improve and integrate practices at the mills. MES was
indeed a modern system, far superior to the obsolete system it came to replace. Yet, in implementing the system, PaperMill
largely failed to introduce change and thus prevented the realization of PaperPack’s strategic intent. We elaborate on this
below.
Superﬁcially, everyone agreed that the new system was radically different and that the new qualities of the system had
been helpful in attaining user acceptance:
You want to have something new and, on the surface, or how should I put it, when you look at it there’s a huge difference
to go from [. . .] a terminal-based system that has no graphics at all – text-based – to having a Windows environment [---]
you get a more user-friendly, more accessible system [. . .] you don’t have to learn where you ﬁnd things [. . .] you don’t
have to ﬁght with the system the same way as if it was a terminal-based system. (Project manager)
The differences, however, not only related to the user interface but also included who could access key systems and to what
end. For example, prior to MES, the production process was largely dependent on printouts (i.e. paper-based lists of all prod-
ucts to be produced within a production period, along with speciﬁcations for each product) that were hard to understand and
process. Moreover, working with paper meant that any change of plans required distribution of new printouts. Consequently,
shop-ﬂoor workers found it hard to keep track of the production, adding to an already complex operating environment. This
also created risk when late changes were made, which contributed to the trim planners’ general reluctance for change in
production plans. While adequately supporting the technical process – old systems are in this respect often hard to beat
– the lack of rich communication and navigational support thus constituted a major weakness. In contrast, MES offers im-
proved support for communication and carrying out tasks e.g. by allowing (near) real-time tracking of products and pro-
cesses, making the production more transparent. Thus, MES provides a baseline for extensive mill level coordination.
According to the former CIO this, in turn, enables delegation of tasks down to the shop-ﬂoor. Similarly, the project manager
– when pushed – argued that the added functionality enabled situational trim-adjustments directly at the winder, decreas-
ing reliance on trim planners (who are only available during ofﬁce hours while production takes place around the clock).
While delegation did take place under LS, the IT engineer interviewed acknowledged that the improved capabilities offered
by MES enabled the shifting of responsibility even further towards the shop-ﬂoor, making the process more adaptive and
ﬂexible. This would, however, necessitate re-organizing practice and as implementation of such changes was not viewed
as part of the implementation project, there were no attempts to make them.
Furthermore, as MES offers trim planners access to all pertinent data, it reduces the need to transfer data between sys-
tems and therefore also the risk of errors and the complexity of trimming. MES also offers trim planners the ability to ﬁne
tune trims by ‘‘dragging-and-dropping’’ graphically-coded products across visual representations of the plan; earlier, they
were reliant on making text manipulations, while juggling information across several systems, to produce a good plan.
Through these simpliﬁcations, MES, in theory, enables new trimming practices (e.g. through either importing new or altering
existing practical considerations while trimming). No such change was observed, however, or even deemed necessary by the
trim planners. This is puzzling as the practice by which trim plans are made has signiﬁcant consequences for both upstream
and downstream work (Fig. 2) and thus has a key impact on the eventual realization of the strategic intent. For example,
consider Loading. While the trim planner interviewed has always argued that he takes Loading into consideration, the load-
ers interviewed felt differently, arguing that he lacked an appreciation of their situation and his own impact on their work
situation – a view corroborated by the IT engineer. In particular, the – to them – disorderly fashion in which products often
arrive according to the plan creates unnecessary work (adding mileage and increasing fuel consumption), increases risk of
damaging products (non-uniform pairs and single products are harder to operate than twin sets) and worsens an already
poor work environment (loaders are operating diesel-trucks in an indoor warehouse). Similarly, consider Production. For
winder operators, non-complex trim patterns are preferred as this reduces the need for knife adjustments. To them, fewer
knife combinations make the process smoother and contribute to faster, more efﬁcient, production. Against this backdrop,
operators have a hard time understanding why there are so many changes and – like loaders – argue that Planning lacks
understanding of the downstream effects that they produce. While downstream complaints like these are, to some extent,
inevitable, it is interesting to note that Sales, too, raised concerns. Frustrated with what he perceived as a lack of ﬂexibility on
the part of Planning, a sales ofﬁcer argued that the planners did not use the new system to its full potential. In particular, he
had a hard time understanding why trim planners were still so averse to change given that the system makes re-trimming
less complicated and change, hence, less disruptive. Opinions thus vary as to whether planners take responsibility for min-
imizing production issues in using the new system.
MES also offered improved capabilities for the loaders. Much as trimmers ‘‘drag-and-drop’’ products across plans, load-
ers can use MES to assign products to a ramp of their choice. While still being affected by the trim plan, this functionality
offers the loaders more control, carving out space for doing things differently. Yet, despite this capability being embedded
in most loaders’ routines, no signiﬁcant changes to practice have occurred. Further, despite clear ﬁnancial incentives, the
implementation of MES did not lead to any investigations as to how the increased control enabled by MES could improve
Loading/Shipping optimization. Nor was the possibility to trim differently now that loading was less ‘‘trim plan critical’’
explored. Indeed, once again, our respondents indicated that no such change has even been considered while implement-
ing MES. In fact, many respondents even questioned the relevance of doing so: to them, change was simply not part of the
implementation project.
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they work [. . .] What they have now is a different user interface to do the same thing as before. And sure, through that
they now have a better tool – so to speak – to ﬁx things that go wrong in their everyday practices, but the work process
itself is still the same, there’s no difference. (Project manager)
Well, things are slightly easier, but it is not better, No. There is nothing new. We’re not trimming differently. (Trim
planner)
[No one] has discussed the strategic importance of switching systems [---] I don’t think there were ever any goals or that
anyone ever had any. . . hope of change. (Head of Planning)
Given the strategic intent underlying the decision to implement the system and how this seems aligned with the new
system’s capabilities, statements like these are puzzling. Realization of the strategic intent indeed necessitated signiﬁcant
change to how practices interrelate and interact. The rest of our ﬁndings offer insight into how this outcome came to be.
In so doing, we focus on the project team as the outcome is strongly connected to how the implementation unfolded and
how the intent was translated and communicated by the team.4.5. MES implementation as practice
The project team consisted of a project manager, members from Planning (Head of Planning and a trim planner) and rep-
resentatives from IT and Production (the IT engineer technically represented Production). When deemed necessary, a repre-
sentative from Loading was also present. In one sense, the project was fairly traditional, following the ‘‘PaperMill Standard’’:
a SharePoint project site to administer the project, frequent work meetings for brieﬁngs and speciﬁcation of requirements
and inclusion of relevant stakeholders. In another sense, the project was unusual: PaperPack mills operate semi-autono-
mously and so it is rare that projects originate from the top. As the project originated in PaperPack, a central project coor-
dinator was technically part of the project team. According to the project manager, however, his role was primarily to
develop data warehouse solutions that would enable standardized data reports. The project manager saw this as a project
in itself; in practice, the ‘two projects’ also operated in isolation.
This lack of interaction, however, can only partially explain how the project came to be framed and, thus, why the stra-
tegic intent failed to manifest itself in the implementation; at some level, the project team seems to have been aware of
the new strategic intent, but rather than acknowledging it they seemed more insistent of downplaying its relevance. In
fact, in handing us documentation outlining the strategic intent, the respondent stressed: ‘‘no one at PaperMill had a part
in articulating these intents [. . .] they were created centrally’’. He also made it clear that implementation costs had been
underestimated and that the stated returns had not materialized. These statements highlight not only that expected
returns were absent, but also a clear difference in how the strategic role of the system was perceived at the meso
(PaperMill) and macro level (PaperPack). Both project manager and Head of Planning also claimed that the implementation
had led to no observable improvement in mill efﬁciency: ‘‘. . .to quantify gains, it is really hard. I have to agree with [the
Head of Planning] there. It has not worsened and that is, in a sense, good. Slightly better, perhaps, but it is not measur-
able.’’ Whilst perhaps unsurprising that returns did not materialize and that performance has remained the same given
that the implementation failed to trigger organizational change, statements like these offer valuable insight into the
cultural conservatism and prevalent risk-averse attitude that came to shape the project team’s perception of the rationale
underlying the system implementation.
Respondents at PaperMill generally acknowledged the potential of strategic beneﬁts for PaperPack – several respondents,
for example, stated that the new MES could help improve customer relations (e.g. by making production more transparent)
and allow sales ofﬁcers to distribute orders more efﬁciently (e.g. through standardizing data reports). In contrast, they were
reluctant to talk about how MES could affect practices at PaperMill: only when pushed did respondents typically talk about
change-related strategic beneﬁts for the mill and, even then, they were skeptical that the new MES could ever improve per-
formance. They often added, in fact, that it had not – downplaying the strategic beneﬁt at the mill level. In so doing, they
complemented the ‘‘discourse of necessity’’ – a discourse used by PaperPack as justiﬁcation for their greater standardization
effort – with a ‘‘discourse of replacement’’ i.e. they not only communicated that the implementation was something that had
to be done, but also that MES merely replaced LS. For example, the trim planner said: ‘‘We want to achieve the same pro-
ductivity and the same efﬁciency as usual. We do not want things to deteriorate and that is our goal. And we have built
the project that way – that it simply should not become worse than it was before.’’ In a similar vein, the Head of Planning
argued: ‘‘I do not know if there is any real difference compared to [LS].’’ Talking about change, coordination and information
ﬂows, the trim planner said: ‘‘It was never part of [our discussions] that [MES] should improve information between [work
practices]’’ and ‘‘It was merely supposed to replace an old tool and we just had to do it’’. Addressing the general issue of stra-
tegic change, the Head of Planning similarly said: ‘‘I do not think that has been an issue at all. Things were supposed to work
as before, really.’’ Elaborating on this, he later stated:
I would say that it’s more a matter of replacing systems [. . .] it’s been more that. . . well, the old systemwas old, and it was
time to change, and there is this decision from the top that we should have the same system at all mills. (Head of
Planning)
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way of framing the project had clear implications for how the implementation unfolded. Rather than treating the project as
strategic, the project rapidly took on a technical form with technical issues and preservation of status quo being dominant
elements in the accounts of how and why the process had proceeded the way that it did. For example, when asked to de-
scribe key issues in the implementation, the project manager said:
‘‘We were set on this being an implementation project, but in reality it has become a systems development project. As a
result of this, the project coordinators have come to see that the system they thought was fairly good, in fact wasn’t.’’
(Project manager)
Importantly, though, these issues were generally not seen as a hindrance to realizing any strategic change, rather they were
typically perceived as nuisances; risk-elements threatening a successful implementation. In this sense, by treating the sys-
tem as a replacement, the project team was able to reduce risks in implementation, as a replacement logic allowed them to
accommodate for, rather than shake up existing practices. Not only did this reduce the perceived risk of change, it also helped
achieve buy-in from the users as they, essentially, just ended up with a better tool to do the same thing. In the end, the gen-
eral consensus post-implementation was that things had turned out okay and that the system, much thanks to these accom-
modation efforts, had been successfully implemented – a view that, according to the project manager, was shared by people
on the ﬂoor. While aiding the IT implementation, however, this accommodation strategy inhibited change as the project
team actively produced the perception of the system as a threat, rather than an opportunity.
In this sense, the decision to accommodate for existing practices indicates, on the one hand, either unwillingness or
inability to perceive change as necessary, desirable or even possible and, on the other hand, a general view of change itself
as a risk – something to avoid. Consequently, the project team exerted signiﬁcant effort to adapt the system to the local con-
text, making new functionality compatible with pre-existing practices, processes and machine conﬁgurations: the ﬂexible IT
artifact became forged around the status quo.
4.6. The fallacy of perceived determinism
Maintaining status quo through accommodation was also largely justiﬁed and motivated by fatalistic statements – typi-
cally with reference to the paper machine – that paper production had to be done a particular way due to the conﬁgurations
of physical machinery at the mill.
You can’t govern the process, or how should I put it, adjust with the IT system. The IT system has to be adapted to the
physical reality and the workﬂow that you have to keep as a result to get it to be effective [. . .] okay, it’s a nice thought
[. . .] but once you tune it so that it ﬁts your mill you end up quite far from the standard system you started out with, so
the ﬁnancial return you expect, it is pretty much gone. (Project manager)
These statements provide further insight into the risk-averse rationale that shaped the implementation of MES. As change
was deemed impossible, it became something to avoid – a threat to successful implementation – making accommodation an
ideal strategy. These statements also serve rhetorical purposes: they help maintain the institutionalized system of meaning
(i.e. the practical ordering and understanding of the organizational practice to which individual practices relate) by virtue of
perceived necessity.
While reducing IT implementation risk, the view that machine conﬁgurations determine practice is, however, not neces-
sarily correct. We indeed came across differences both within – i.e. between practices of shifts and routines of individuals –
and across mills. For example, loaders lamented the change of trim planners at the mill as they felt that plans now showed a
greater lack of understanding for their work. Similarly, managers raised concerns with regards to differences in production
strategies implemented by different shifts. Development and dissemination of best practices across mills were also part of
PaperPack’s explicit intent for implementing the standardized MES. Accordingly, machine conﬁgurations make different
ways of organizing the production possible. Prior to our initial study, PaperMill had also successfully switched from a
two-week to a one-week production cycle, further supporting this point.
As several respondents made references to the need to maintain efﬁciency, it is also important to note that PaperPack’s
strategic intent was not to maximize the raw output from given resources at each mill, but rather to ultimately improve cus-
tomer satisfaction by integrating and improving work practices in order to, for example, reduce lead times and make pro-
duction more ﬂexible and responsive to customer needs. Given this, unrealized changes suggested by our respondents –
e.g. delegating tasks closer to the production ﬂoor or making better use of improved re-trimming capabilities (see Section 4.4)
– appear both feasible and strategically aligned. While PaperPack’s exact ambitions remain unclear – no detailed metrics
were given – changes necessary to realize the strategic intent underlying the new MES thus seem better understood as un-
wanted, ignored or misunderstood than impossible.
Against this backdrop, machine conﬁgurations – while providing structure (e.g. boundary conditions in terms of maxi-
mum and minimum speed, width and quality of the paper and a given sequence of events) and discursively upholding exist-
ing practices (e.g. by virtue of perceived necessity) – cannot convincingly be held to determine a speciﬁc arrangement of
practices: in short, ‘machine determinism’ offers an inadequate explanation of the outcome observed here as the extent
to which machines determine practice in discourse simply does not meet with reality.
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change were, in fact, often located in the ﬁxed institutionalized practices and the ways that the deterministic discourse
had been internalized therein:
If you look at it from the [MES] perspective then you would want to work in a particular way, but it is so deeply rooted
that you work in a. . . often like [MES wants]. But sometimes you are not working by that [. . .] It is impossible to change
[. . .] There has to be a clear beneﬁt for the operator to work in a particular way if you are to succeed [. . .] I can only
ascertain how hard it is to make a change in work routines ‘just because’. It will never work. Something has to be signif-
icantly improved for the operator if you are to succeed. (Project manager)
Statements such as these offer valuable insight into the deep-rooted, cognitive realities that reigned at PaperMill and illus-
trate an alternative explanation rooted in the entrenchment of practices rather than the ultimate rigidity of machines. We
expand on this next.
4.7. The role of entrenchment
At PaperMill, practices have evolved over an extended period of relative stability in an extremely risk-averse environ-
ment. As is typically the case within process industries, even brief production stops have massive economic ramiﬁcations.
Unsurprisingly, production practices are therefore taken for granted: in practice terms, PaperMill have produced a deep-
rooted social arrangement that governs both individual practices and how practices interrelate. In this sense, people have
largely come to accept that there is a ﬁxed way of doing things, something one simply has to cope with i.e. highly institu-
tionalized views of roles, norms, values, goals and practices manifest themselves in the ﬁxity of their cognitive schemata. Our
study indicates that this entrenchment inhibited the realization of strategic intent by making people both unable and unwill-
ing to respond to the fundamental changes in environmental conditions associated with the implementation of MES i.e.
changes in strategic intent and access to new IT capabilities and information, which both permitted and necessitated new
forms of sense-making and organizing. Together with the accommodation strategy, this severely restricted exploration
and (novel) use of the new MES, inhibiting the production of necessary change.
Showing a similarly restricted ability to alter their framing of the production process, the project team also rejected the
system’s ability to produce beneﬁcial change throughout the implementation of MES. They failed to perceive the implemen-
tation as an opportunity and, thus, to accurately translate the strategic intent. Consequently, they were unable to adapt to
the strategic change: instead of creatively using the system to enable the new strategic intent, they creatively implemented
the system to reproduce existing practices. As practices were both interconnected and highly entrenched, changes were also
deemed hard to implement, adding to the general reluctance within the project team to disturb the status quo. In this sense,
entrenchment and the associated deep-rooted practices not only diminished the perception of opportunity as the project
team made sense of the implementation, but also increased the perception of risk, providing additional grounds for the
risk-minimizing, disturbance-handling, accommodation approach the project team came to adopt.
Against this backdrop, the processes by which IS strategies become implemented, once formulated, are rich and complex,
dependent on both the situated actors who come to implement them and the practices through which strategic change is
ultimately to be enacted. In the next section, we develop our multi-dimensional view of IS strategy further to unravel the
complexities of this case.
5. Discussion
In this paper, we drew on strategy-as-practice to develop an empirically grounded perspective of the strategic implemen-
tation of a new mill execution system (MES) in a paper mill. Having illustrated the use of our multi-dimensional view of the
IS strategy process, we now develop it further by detailing its core components and underlying dynamics supported by evi-
dence from our case study. We then discuss three key factors that can contribute to strategy blindness as to explain our unor-
thodox ﬁnding, before concluding with a discussion of the implications of this research for IS strategy practice and research.
5.1. A multi-dimensional view of IS strategy
We asked how and why successful organizational implementation of new strategically aligned IT capabilities can lead to
unexpected outcomes, in that they fail to produce intended change. To this end, we conducted a longitudinal case study of
the implementation of a new MES in a Swedish paper mill to explain how and why this strategic IT change resulted in strat-
egy blindness: the incapability of an organization to realize the strategic intent of implemented, available IT capabilities.
Adopting a strategy-as-practice lens, this paper formulates a multi-dimensional view of IS strategy implementation to make
sense of the ﬁndings.
Our ﬁrst contribution to IS strategy is the multi-dimensional view of IS strategy and the associated conceptualization of
three salient challenges for successful IS strategy implementation: (1) selecting system capabilities that align with and en-
able the strategic intent; (2) implementing the systems successfully within the organization and (3) producing the necessary
organizational change to allow the strategic intent to be realized (Fig. 5). Our study clearly indicates that all these dimen-
Fig. 5. A multi-dimensional view of IS strategy.
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trates the usefulness of this view. While traditional approaches have typically failed to consider the full complexity of IS
strategy implementation (cf. Silva and Hirschheim, 2007; Ward, 2012), this view stresses the need to understand strategy
implementation as an embedded process that actors make sense of, respond to and actively shape based on the practices
to which they belong (cf. Orlikowski, 2000). With JSIS’s recent 20th Anniversary Special Issue fresh in mind (e.g. Galliers
et al., 2012; Merali et al., 2012; Nolan, 2012; Ward, 2012), the contribution is also timely. Indeed, by facilitating deeper
understandings of the IS strategy process and the complexities therein, this theoretical view makes us better positioned
to aid practitioners in their struggle to capture intended strategic beneﬁts from their IT use, particularly as the strategic role
of IT becomes increasingly complex.
Importantly, our view expands, rather than rejects, prior conceptualizations of IS strategy. At its core is the traditional
notion of strategic IS implementation as being successful only when the organization achieves intended beneﬁts (e.g. Cooper
and Zmud, 1990), which ultimately depends on how the implemented systems become embedded in new organizational
practice (Doherty and Terry, 2009; Galliers, 2011; Markus and Robey, 2004; Peppard and Ward, 2004; Sambamurthy
et al., 2003). Due to high levels of abstraction, however, extant accounts of IS implementation often lump together, confound
or even ignore the key challenges of strategic IS implementation outlined in this paper (Markus, 2004; Silva and Hirschheim,
2007). While hard to separate in practice, these dimensions are conceptually distinct and clearly associated with their own
challenges (Section 2.1). By unpacking these dimensions, our view thus enables a deeper, detailed understanding of the pro-
cesses by which strategic IS implementation is successfully achieved.
Our case illustrates how IT implementation ideals (e.g. risk avoiding) can run counter to necessities of change implemen-
tation (e.g. risk inducing). By making salient the constant trade-off between system implementation risk and strategic real-
ization risk, it elucidates how and why an imbalanced focus – here the one-sided accommodation strategy – may cause
strategic IS implementation to fail. As the root cause for failure can be found on either side, distinguishing between Successful
IT implementation and Realization of Strategic intent is therefore necessary (cf. Cooper, 2000; Markus, 2004; Robey et al.,
2002). To this end, we deﬁne IT implementation as successful when a system is implemented on time, at reasonable cost
and with acceptable risk (cf. Markus, 2004) and is embedded in organizational routines and, thus, accepted by its users
(cf. Silva and Hirschheim, 2007). In contrast, Realization of strategic intent is considered successful only when organizational
change necessary to realize the strategic intent underlying the implementation has occurred (for a similar distinction, see
Markus, 2004).
IS strategy implementation can, furthermore, fail due to inappropriate selection of system capabilities (Mähring et al.,
2004; Thompson et al., 2010). Examining this in more detail, we distinguish Alignment between Strategic intent and IT capa-
bilities from the processes by which Realization of Strategic intent is achieved. In so doing, we move beyond the traditional
view of IT alignment where system alignment is assessed ex post, as this view obscures the distinct challenges associated
with each dimension (Fig. 5) and thus inhibits identiﬁcation of the root cause (for a critical discussion, see Ciborra, 1997).
Had we, for example, not investigated whether the new system supported the strategic intent, we could not as convincingly
attributed the strategic failure to the processes of adaptation and use and the role of entrenchment therein; the failure may,
instead, have been the result of misalignment between capabilities and intent (e.g. Pollock and Cornford, 2004; Wagner and
Newell, 2004). Thus, we deﬁne Alignment between Strategic intent and IT capabilities as successful when selected system capa-
bilities enable the strategic intent that the organization wishes to realize.
With these key dimensions deﬁned, we now turn to the analysis of our case study. In so doing, we highlight the need to
view IS strategy as an embedded process. First, our data indicate that the new systemwas capable of enabling change aligned
Fig. 6. Strategy blindness within the multi-dimensional view.
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while the implementation proved harder than ﬁrst thought, our data indicate that the IT implementation was largely suc-
cessful – both in terms of time, budget and risk and the way the system is now accepted by, and embedded in, the organi-
zational routines of its users. Third, our data show no indication, however, that the system has led to changes necessary to
realize the strategic intent underlying the implementation. While such realization may emerge over time (Robey et al.,
2002), we therefore conclude that the strategic IS implementation, to date, is a failure; instead of strategic change, PaperMill
produced strategy blindness (Fig. 6). To make sense of this unorthodox ﬁnding, it is necessary to account for the ways that
actors make sense of, respond to and actively shape strategic processes based on the practices to which they belong, eluci-
dating interactions between the IS strategy and the practice in which it is implemented. We expand on this next, while
detailing the particularities of our case.
5.2. Strategy blindness within strategic IS implementation
Our second contribution to IS strategy is the understanding of constituent factors and processes that can produce strategy
blindness, in particular with regards to the role of entrenchment. In the following discussion, we re-evaluate and expand past
claims that an IS strategy process must take into account the way it is enacted (Chan et al., 1997; Chan and Reich, 2007;
Galliers, 2004; Melville et al., 2004; Piccoli and Ives, 2005; Silva and Hirschheim, 2007; Wade and Hulland, 2004; Ward
and Peppard, 2002). In particular, we highlight how IS strategy implementation processes are rich and complex, dependent
on both the situated actors who implement them and the practices through which strategic change must ultimately be en-
acted. While assuming equiﬁnality, in that strategy blindness – as a general IS strategy outcome (Fig. 6) – may be produced in
many ways, three factors appear particularly salient to the production of strategy blindness at PaperMill: (1) failed speciﬁ-
cation, communication and translation of intent; (2) IT artifact ﬂexibility and (3) cognitive entrenchment. We discuss each of
these next.
Strategy blindness is particularly salient in the (mis)translation of strategic intent during the implementation stage of the
IS strategy process. At PaperMill, failed speciﬁcation and communication of the strategic intent indeed created the origins of
strategy blindness because the strategic intent, as deﬁned by PaperPack, never translated into a strategic implementation
plan capable of enacting a perception of strategic change as necessary at the mill level. While these results lend support
to prior literature that highlights the need for effective communication of the intent underlying change initiatives (Keil
et al., 2000), our analysis indicates that there is more than mere communication failure occurring: this study shows how
the presence of multiple (albeit non-conﬂicting and overlapping) strategies can produce a legitimizing ‘ambiguity of intent’,
which affects how change-recipients translate signaled intents during implementation and thus how strategic IS become
implemented in use. The existence of a standardizing strategy, for example, allowed the project team to justify and rational-
ize the view of the system as a replacement, in turn enabling their risk-minimizing, accommodation approach. By highlight-
ing the salient role of the speciﬁcation, communication and translation of intents within strategic IS implementations and
afﬁrming the important role of change-recipients as construers and constructors of change (Balogun, 2006; Balogun and
Johnson, 2005, 2004; Stensaker and Falkenberg, 2007), this study has pivotal implications for IS strategy practice and
research.
By structuring the implementation process, the ﬂexibility of the IT artifact also matters for the production of strategy
blindness. While prior studies have observed that IT artifact ﬂexibility affects its emergent use (e.g. Orlikowski, 2000), the
role of artifact ﬂexibility during strategic IS implementation is little understood. As shown here, however, the ﬂexibility
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example, the ﬂexibility of MES made it possible to accommodate existing practices during implementation. On the one hand,
it allowed the project team to treat the system as a technical replacement, enabling a disconnect between the strategic intent
and its translation in practice through continuous adaptations; on the other hand, it proved incapable of imposing a new
logic on practice and encourage or provoke change (cf. Brynjolfsson et al., 1997). The effects become particularly clear in con-
trast with the paper machine: a huge, rigid artifact with a clearly perceived logic to which production practices have bent to
the point that it is viewed as determinant. Against calls to bring the IT artifact into theory development (Orlikowski and Iac-
ono, 2001), this highlights an interesting opportunity for IS strategy research to uncover how the particular characteristics of
technology can affect strategic outcomes.
Last, cognitive entrenchment provides a particularly salient source of strategy blindness. Entrenchment is viewed here as
a condition in which ﬁxed, stable frames make practices immune to changes in their environment by making situated actors
ignore information that would permit or necessitate new forms of sense-making and understanding (Section 2.2). By linking
the concept of entrenchment to the (re)production of strategy blindness, we extend and corroborate earlier studies on the
effect of entrenchment on organizational change (see Dane, 2010). At PaperMill, entrenchment played a key role for the stra-
tegic failure, as it suffocated the organizational change necessary for the realization of PaperPack’s strategic intent. Both
unwilling and unable to adapt to the change, the project team, for example, creatively implemented the system so as to
accommodate existing practices. Recognizing the ﬁxity and complexity of the highly interrelated production practices, they,
in fact, actively avoided change. Reﬂecting the institutionalized aversion of risk at PaperMill, the MES implementation came
to be perceived as a threat rather than an opportunity (cf. Beaudry and Pinsonneault, 2005). In this way, entrenchment – and
associated deep-rooted practices – may not only make actors blind to the opportunity afforded by new IT systems, but also
increase actors’ perception of risk, providing grounds for disturbance-handling, accommodation approaches such as those ob-
served here (Beaudry and Pinsonneault, 2005). This ﬁnding well illustrates the need for a multi-dimensional view of IS strat-
egy: to understand the outcomes that are produced, we must inevitably account for how practically situated actors make
sense of, respond to and actively shape strategic processes, in effect elucidating interactions between the IS strategy process
and the practices it seeks to affect.
As alluded to, these factors were interrelated. Jointly shaping the way change-recipients made sense of the change,
they came together in the particular production of strategy blindness observed here. The ﬂexibility of the artifact
was, for example, integral to the translation of the strategic intent. Similarly, as entrenched actors are less receptive
to change, cognitive entrenchment aided the mistranslation of the intent while the (IT-assisted) mistranslation recur-
sively shielded actors’ entrenched schemata. Further research could help uncover the nature of these relationships in
more detail as well as explore other possible antecedents to strategy blindness: the context and culture within which
practices and organizations are situated may, for example, be critical features that affect to what extent organizations
are prone to strategy blindness. Similarly, while we point out that cognitive entrenchment is a likely key source of strat-
egy blindness, there might be situations where organizations produce strategy blindness despite showing ﬂexibility in
their cognitive schemata.
5.3. Implications for research and practice
Our multi-dimensional, practice-based view of IS strategy has several implications. First, it complements and extends the
literature on IS strategy by detailing the intricate complexities involved in IS strategy practice. Despite being a signiﬁcant
challenge to IS strategy, IS literature has not adequately accounted for the fact that strategic intent is not always realized,
even when the system is strategically aligned and the IT implementation is successful (Robey et al., 2002). This paper illus-
trates how cognitive entrenchment and associated ﬁxity of situated practices can deeply impact the ways in which change-
recipients – such as project teams – frame, and thus cope with, the intended change and how this, in turn, may shape the
implementation and subsequent IT use in ways that create strategy failures despite successful implementation of strategi-
cally aligned systems. Having illustrated the ability of our theoretical view to account for the real-world complexity of the IS
strategy implementation, we indeed hope that we have inspired further investigations of strategic IS implementations as
unfolding, embedded processes, inseparable from the practices they seek to change.
Second, process industries are, for good reasons, often risk-averse. A risk-averse cultural DNA might prove particularly
challenging when implementing strategies that require changes in complex systems of practice – such as highly interdepen-
dent, coherent processes (cf. Schatzki et al., 2001). Indeed, albeit inconclusive, our study indicates a relationship between
high degrees of conservatism and cognitive entrenchment (Dane, 2010). Thus, we posit that strategy blindness is more likely
to occur in conservative organizations such as PaperMill, where the project team, by treating the system as a replacement,
sought to minimize risks and protect the status quo. These results are consistent with previous research showing that, where
risks exceed beneﬁts, changes are likely to be resisted (e.g. Beaudry and Pinsonneault, 2005) and that culturally normative
practices will be protected (Dane, 2010). As change necessarily incurs risk, this indicates a constant trade-off between sys-
tem implementation risk and strategy realization, another area where this study and its associated strategy-as-practice view
of IS strategy opens up fruitful areas for further research.
Last, we contribute to IS strategy practice by characterizing IS strategy multi-dimensionally and suggesting how ﬁrms
need to consider all dimensions in their IS strategy practice. Although our study deals with one speciﬁc industrial IT appli-
cation, our ﬁndings provide useful generalizable insights for other IS strategy initiatives. This includes our conceptualization
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challenges that strategists have to overcome during IS strategy implementation. By unpacking these dimensions, this paper
also offers rich foundation for further theorizing. While a practice lens may help us better understand each of these chal-
lenges in isolation, we argue that it can be particularly helpful in teasing out the complexities that arise across the different
dimensions of strategic IS implementation as they engage with organizational practice. Thus, our model both highlights and
opens several fruitful areas for further practice-oriented research within the IS strategy-as-practice stream. As an example,
uncovering the processes by which strategy blindness is (re)produced – and the means by which it can be avoided or
resolved – provides interesting opportunities for future IS strategy research. More research is thus needed to develop the
insights we have provided here, both conceptually and in terms of practical implications.6. Conclusions
This research reveals an unfolding shift in the way in which IS strategy is conceptualized. This shift can be interpreted in
at least two ways. First, IS strategy, as we know it, is at odds with the emerging landscape of IS strategy-as-practice. If the
ﬁeld is to move forward and fully appreciate the complexities involved in IS strategy implementation, a multi-dimensional
view of IS strategy is needed. While welcoming extensions, we believe that we have made some useful steps toward concep-
tualizing such a view. Second, the shift suggests a rich opportunity for future research. In particular, there is a need for lon-
gitudinal studies examining IS strategy-as-practice as conceptualized here. This study identiﬁes several areas for such
research and, through illustrations, shows how the view developed herein can be applied to generate novel, interesting in-
sights. Indeed, we hope to see a stream of practice-based research emerge that investigates the challenges that we have only
begun to explore.References
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